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RECENT CASES.
CARRIERS-Loss OF MANUSCRIPT-MEASURE OF DAMAGES.-SOUTIERN
ExPREss COMPANY V. OWENS, 41 SOUTHERN REP. 752 (ALABAMA).--Hcld,
that in the absence of evidence of the market value of a lost manuscript it is
proper to permit the plaintiff to testify as to the amount of time he had spent
in the preparation of the manuscript and what he considered it worth, on the
ground that where an article is so unusual in character that the market value
cannot be determined, damages must be ascertained in some rational way.
CARRIERS- PASSENGERS-INJURIES - NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE CAUSE.-
SNYDER V. COLORADO SPRINGS & C. C. D. Ry. Co., 85 PACIFIC REP. 686 (COLO.).
A passenger on a crowded car stood near the door with his hand resting on
the door jamb. There were people between him and the door and some on the
steps. The conductor in pushing his way through the crowd pressed the
passenger against a third person sitting in a seat who gave the passenger a
push, throwing him from the car.-Held, that the proximate cause of the
injury was, as a matter of law, the action of the third person, for which the
carrier was not liable.
The sole question here to be determined is,--what was the proximate
cause of the accident? If the action of the conductor was the proximate
cause then the defendant is liable. Bouviers Law Dict., Vol. II, page 790.
defines proximate cause as follows: "That which, in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produces an event and witiout which
the event would not have occurred." The authorities are uniform on the
piont of holding the proximate cause liable for the injury, Cooley on Torts,
7o. But they differ in the application of the rule, 93 U. S. i3o. To render
a railway company liable for injuries to one passenger by another, it
must appear that the company was negligent in failing to put the
passenger, actually doing the injury, off the car, Louisville & N. R. Co.
v. McEwan, 31 S. W. 465. But the conductor must have had notice
or have reasonably foreseen that the passenger doing the injury was
dangerous, Spohn v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 87 Mo. 74. Would it be reasonable
here for the conductor to foresee that the passenger would become irritated
and push the other off the car? But a different view must be entertained if
the original act of the conductor was wrongful. In other words, if he puts in
motion a train of events which finally culminated in the accident, Clark v.
Chambers, 3 Q. B. Div. 327; Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403. (The latter
being the famous and oft quoted "lighted squib case"). However, the decis-
ion should be consistent with principles of rational justice, Baltimore &
Potomac R. R. Co. v. Reaney, 42 Md. I17. The case at hand, considering all
the facts, seems to be rightly decided. Adrian A. Pierson, (Ed.).
CARRIERS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-ALIGIITING FROM MOVING TRAIN.
-TExAs & P. Ry. Co. v. WHITELY, 96 S. WV. io8 (TEx.).-Held, alighting
from a moving train is not contributory negligence per se.
Whether a person who alights from a moving train is guilty of contrib-
utory negligence is a question of fact for the jury, depending on attendant
circumstances. Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. Atkins, 46 Ark. 423; Chicago
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City Ry. Co. v. Munford, 97 Ill. 56o; Galveston, H. & S. F. Ry. Co. v.
Smith, 59 Texas 4o6. And one so alighting from a moving train may recover
for an accident to which his act does not contribute. Van Ostrom v. N. Y.
Cent. & H. R. R.R. Co., 35 Hun. 59o. A passenger alighting from a moving
train at direction of brakeman is not as matter of law guilty of contributory
negligence where there was no obvious danger. Jones v. B. & 0. R. Co., 2!
D. C. 346; Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Webster, 6 Ad. 841. But if conduc-
tor ordered a passenger to leave train while in motion the company would
be liable even though the passenger was guilty of negligence. R. R. Co. v.
Singleton, 66 Ga. 252.
COMMERCE-INTERSTATE COMMERE-INToXicATING LIQuoRs.-Ex PARTE
MASSEY, 92 S. W. xo86 (TExAs).-Held, that a statute making it a misde-
meanor "to solicit an order for the sale" of intoxicating liquors within local
option districts is a violation of the interstate commerce clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution.
When liquor is sold as an import from another state and Congress has
clearly the power to regulate, yet as Congress has made no regulation on the
subject, the traffic may be lawfully regulated by state as soon as it is landed
in its territory. License Cases, 5 How. 504 and 586 (N. H., R. I., Mass.).
This case was overruled by Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. Ioo. Whenever the
law of a state amounts essentially to a regulation of commerce among the
states, as it does when it inhibits directly or indirectly the receipt of a com-
modity before it has ceased to become an article of trade between one state
and another, it comes in conflict with the interstate commerce clause of the
Constitution and is void. Leisy v. Hardin, supra. The right to regulate
the sale of a commodity after it has been brought into the state does not
carry with it the power to prevent its introduction by transportation from
another state. Bowman v. Chicago, etc.. Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 500 (Ia.).
The sale of intoxicating liquors is a legitimate subject of trade and inter-
state commerce, and is subject, as such, to no restrictions unless the same
can be justified under the police power of the state. McCulloch v. Brown,
23 L. R. A. 410. Under prosecution under final statute for soliciting sale of
liquors held, intoxicating liquors are a legitimate subject of commerce and
burdens thereon cannot be justified under the police power of the state. Ex-
parte Loeb, 72 Fed. 657 (S. C.). In New Hampshire a similar statute was
declared void as being a regulation of interstate commerce without the con-
sent of Congress. Durkee v. Moses, 23 Aft. 793 (N. H.).
COMMON CARRIER-LIABILITY OF OWNER OF PASSENGER ELEVATOR.-
EDWARDS V. MANUFACTURER'S BUILDING Co., 6i ATL. REP. 446 (R. I.).-Held,
that a landlord who maintains an elevator in his private building for the use
of tenants and their employees and customers is not a common carrier, and
hence is not bound to the same degree of care required of a common carrier,
but only to exercise reasonable care for the safety of persons using the eleva-
tor, thus following the doctrine as laid down by the New York courts.
Griffin v. Manice, 59 N. E. Rep. 925.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION OF CONTRAcT.-
KNOXVILLE WATER COMPANY V. MAYER OF CITY OF KNOXVILLE, 26 SUPREME
COURT REP. 224.-Held, that an agreement by a municipality to give a water
company an exclusive franchise of thirty years, as against any other person
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or corporation, is not impaired by the establishment by the municipality of
its own independent system of water-works under subsequent legislative
authority.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-LABOR LAWS-POLICE POwER-FREEDoM OF CoN-
-TRACT-PEOPLE V. WILLIAMS, ioO NEw YORK SUPPLEMENT, 3 27 Held, that a
statute prohibiting any female from being employed. permitted or suffered to
work in any factory in the state, before six o'clock in the morning or after
nine o'clock in the evening of any day, etc., was not a valid exercise of police
power in the interest of the health of female employees and the public wel-
fare, but was an unconstitutional infringement on the female's liberty to con-
tract for her own labor guaranteed by statute.
This point, with regard to the hours within which a female may work,
-seems never to have arisen in this country, the general rule being, however,
that legislation in regard to the number of hours during which women or
children may work is a valid exercise of police power. Commonwealth v.
Hamilton Manufacturing Co., 12o Mass. 383. Approved in Holden v. Hardy,
169 U. S. 366. It is said that the restrictions upon the employment of women
in underground or night work are generally accepted as sanitary regulations
in the interest of morals and decency. Freund's Police Power, 121.
The police power of a state, however, is not subject to any definite lim-
itation but is co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguard
of the public interests. Cailifield v. U. S. 167 U. S. 518. See Comment,
.supra.
CONTRACTs-REScIsSIoN-WAIVER OF GROUND.-ST. REGIS PAPER CO. V.
SANTA CLARA LUMBER Co., 78 N. E. 701. A contract by defendant to deliver
pulp-wood to a paper company bound the company to make advances to
defendant during the progress of the work of cutting and hauling the wood
not exceeding its cost. Defendant notified the company of its intention to
rescind the contract unless the requests for advances were complied with,
but continued to take the money, less that the cost of the wood by one-third,
which the company thereafter advanced.-Held, that the receipt of the money
operated to abrogate defendant's right to rescind. Gray, J., dissenting.
While a party to a valid contract cannot rescind at pleasure, Bowman v.
Ayers, 2 Idaho 465, nevertheless, a party has the right to rescind a contract
entirely where there has been a material breach by the other party to the con-
tract. Pollock on Contracts, Third Edition, page 334; Allen v. Webb, 24
N. H. 278. A party who is entitled to repudiate a contract, and who wishes
to rescind it, must do so distinctly and unequivocally. He cannot treat the
contract as binding and rescinded at the same time. Weeks v. Robie, 42 N.
I-I. 316. If he negotiates with the party, after knowledge of the breach, and
permits him to proceed in the work, it is a waiver of his right to rescind the
contract. Lawrence v. Dale, 3 Johns. Ch. 23.
CONVEYANCING-CONSTRUCTION OF DEED OF MINERALS.-GRIFFIN V. FAIR-
MONT COAL CO., 53 S. E. REP. 24 (W. VIRGINIA).-Held, that a deed convey-
ing the coal under a tract of land, together with the right to enter upon and
under the land to mine the coal, does not contain any implied reservation that
sufficient coal must be left to support the surface but that the grantee is
entitled to take away all of the coal and allow the surface to collapse. Paf-
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fenbarger, J., dissenting. See Comment, YALE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. XVI, page
48.
COPYRIGHTS-WHAT CONSTITUTES INFRINGEMENT-SAMPSON & MUR-
DocK Co. v. SEAVER-RADFORD Co., 140 FED. 539.-Held, that a person's
action in copying names and addresses from complainant's city directory, veri-
fying these by sending canvassers to the addresses given and afterwards pub-
lishing unchanged such information as was found to be correct, was an
infringement.
CORPORATIONS-FoREIGN CORPORATIONS-NoTICE To ATTORNEYS.-STATE EX
INF. HADLEY ATTY. GEN. V. STANDARD OI. Co., OF IND. ET AL. 91 S. W. (Mo.)
io62.-Held, that notice to an attorney of record is notice to the client in
proceedings against a foreign corporation.
This doctrine was established to avert the evils resulting from the opera-
tion of the contrary view. St. Clair ,. Cox, 1O6 U. S. 350. Under this view
foreign corporations could not be sued. McQueen v. Middleton Mfg.
Co., i6 Johnson (N. Y.) 5. Attachment upon property within the court's
jurisdiction was the only remedy. Robb v. Chicago & Q. R. Co., 47 Mo. 540;
Andrews v. Mich. Cen. R. R. Co., 99 Mass. 534. With the great increase in
the number of corporations the federal court in Massachusetts revoked the
state practice. Hayden v. Androscoggin Mills, I Fed. 93. This view has
been followed subsequently: Eureka Lake Co. v. Yuba County, 116 U. S. 410;
though not universally. Williams v. Iron Bolt B. & L. Ass'n., 131 N. C. 267.
Under this doctrine the state may prescribe its own conditions for service of
-process upon foreign corporations. Van Dresser & Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co.,
.48 Fed. 202; and by doing business such corporations waive their rights to
object. Merchant's Mfg. Co. v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 13 Fed. 358. A rule
contrary to the one as stated in the principal case has been held. Thatch v.
Continental Traveler's Mutual Accident Ass., 114 Tenn. 271.
CORPORATIONS-STATUTORY LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS-ENFORCEMENT
IN OTHER STATES.-CONVERSE V. AETNA NAT. BANK, 64 ATL. 341 (CONN.).-
Held, that by purchasing stock in a corporation the stockholder incurs a lia-
bility to perform such contractual obligations as are attached by the laws of
the corporation's domicile to the ownership of its capital stock, statutory lia-
bilities imposed upon stockholders being such contractual obligations. Ham-
ersley, Case, JJ., dissenting.
This decision is in harmony with the presnt tendency in most jurisdic-
tions towards a liberal enforcement of the statutory liabilities of stockhold-
ers in a corporation created under the laws of another state. Most states
enforce these statutory liabilities, imposed upon stockholders by the laws of
another state, under the head of contractual obligations. First Nat. Bank, of
Deadwood v. Gustin Minerva Consolidated Mining Co., 42 Minn. 327. For-
mer decisions inclined to construe such statutes as penal in their nature, and
hence, were extremely reluctant to enforce them. Sayles v. Brown, 4 Fed. 8.
'he courts of a few states still refuse to countenance their enforcement.
Crippen v. Laighton, 69 N. H. 54o. All courts hold that a special remedy
is exclusive and the liability imposed by such a statute will not be enforced
'in another state, where such remedy is not afforded by the law of such other
state. Russell v. Pacific Railway Co., 113 Cal. 258. Nor will such a statu-
tory obligation be enforced when a suit in equity would be necessary to adjust
the claims of the various parties. Bates v. Day, 198 Pa. State 513.
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COiORATIONS-LIABiLrrY FOR SLANDER.-SAWYER V. NORFOLK & S. R. Co.,
54 S. E. 793 (NORTH CAROLINA).-Held, that a corporation may be lia-
ble for slander committed by its agent or employee.
Slander is oral defamation published without legal excuse. Defamation
is understood to be a false publication calculated to bring one into disrepute.
Publication in a legal sense is when the defamation is put before one or
more third persons. Cooley on Torts, 225. The rule regarding liability of
a corporation for a tort is the same as applies to an individual. Baltimore
& P. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 2 Sup. Ct 719. A corporation
can be held liable for slandering another corporation. Buffalo Lubricat-
ing Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 42 Hun. 153. Contra. "However, it seems
to have been held in many early cases that a corporation could not be liable
as it had to act through its agents or officers. Townshend on Libel and Slan-
der, 474. The weight of authority now is that "while it is true that a corpo-
ration cannot itself speak and therefore cannot itself slander, neither can a cor-
poration itself make false representations and yet a corporation may be lia-
ble for false representation of its agents for the same reasons; it may be
liable for slander." Marshall on Corporations, 3 t1, note i6.
CRIMINAL LAW-WITNESSES-WEIGHT OF TESTIMONY.-GORDON V. 
STATE,
41 SOUTH. 848 (ALA.).-Held, that an instruction in a criminal case that the
jury should be very "cautious and careful" in weighing the testimony of a
child who had testified, was properly refused as invoking the province of the
jury.
It is primarily and generally conceded that the charge should be entirely
free from intimating any opinion as to the weight of evidence, Rawles v.
State, 97 Ga. i86; Andrews v. People, 60 Ill. 354; and the charge- is error if
an opinion to the jury is expressed as to the credibility of witnesses. Com-
monwealth v. Barry, 91 Mass. 276; Ross v. State, 29 Tex. 499. Likewise in
case of a wife, who testified in favor of husband, it is error for the judge to
instruct jury that the testimony should be received with "great caution" or
evidence "entitled to great weight" or that it should be examined with
"peculiar care." State v. Guyer, 6 Iowa 263; Steele v. State, 83 Ala. 2o;
State v. Bernard, 45 Iowa 234. Whether the evidence is strong or slight is
in the province of the jury, People v. Ah Sing, 59 California 4oo; though, in
the Federal Courts an expression of opinion by the court as to the weight of
evidence is permissible. Allis v. United States, i55 W. S. 117. Still the jury
as judge of facts rule is occasionally limited by allowing comments on the
evidence, so long as such comments do not amount to a direction or advice
as to how the jury shall decide the facts to which the evidence relates. State
v. Duffy, 57 Conn. 525.
CRIMINAL LAw-RIGHTS OF AccusED TO BE CONFRONTED By WINEss.-
RALPH v. STATE, 52 S. E. 298 (GA.).-Held, that where the accused
in a criminal prosecution is deaf, the court should permit the evidence of the
witnesses to be communicated to him in some manner. The trial court was
not in error for refusing to postpone the trial until an expert typewriter
could be obtained to take evidence on the machine as it was given, but the
requirements of the Constitution were satisfied by the action of the court
in allowing counsel for the accused to write down the testimony as the trial
progressed and allowing accused to read it
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CRIMINAL LAW-EIDENcE-CHARAcTER.-PEOPLE V. PELSAR , 78 N. F
294 (N. Y.).-Held, where there was no evidence offered as to the character
of defendant, accused of felony, he was not entitled to an instruction, that
the presumption that his character was good must be considered by the jury.
The general rule in the United States and England is that in criminal
cases there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of the prisoner's innocence.
Tweedy v. State, 5 Iowa 433; Home v. State, I Kan. 2. And the felon may
always put witnesses in evidence to prove his general character. Roscoe's
Crim. Law Evidence, i96. Until then the state cannot attack his character;
nor even then, examine the defendant as to particular facts of his prior
character. State v. Tozier, 49 Me. 4o4. However, when he does not offer
evidence of his character, the law assumes that it is of ordinary fairness and
the jury cannot assume that it be good or bad but must give a verdict solely
on the evidence presented. Danner v. State, 54 Ala. i27; State v. Kabrick,
39 Ia. 277. So in this case, the prisoner's prior character is immaterial and
the jury cannot assume that it is bad and thus infer that he is guilty of the
crime charged. Ackley v. People, 9 Barb. 6o6; State v. Dockstader, 42 Ia.
436. His former good character offers no presumption of his innocence.
People v. Lee, 8I Pa. 969; People v. Griffith, 146 Cal. 339. But where
the prisoner's general character is in issue his character evidence may
go to the jury though it be of little avail. McKelvey on Evidence. 153.
It is sometimes held that if the act is of an atrocious nature such evidence
is of no avail. People v. Mead, 5o Mich. :228. This doctrine is generally
disapproved in United States. McKelvey on Evidence, 153. Moreover,
in such cases, if there is doubt in the jury's mind, their verdict should be for
the defendant. U. S. v. Means, 42 Fed. 599; Walker v. State, 136 Ind. 663.
DAMAGES-BREAcH OF CONTRAcT-ERROR IN LOCATING HousE.-OKEN
V. HENDERSON, 99 N. Y. Supp. 917.-Held, that where a contractor did not
construct a house on the lines specified in the plans, the measure of damages
was the difference between the value of the property as it was and as it
would have been, if the house had been constructed according to contract.
Hooper, J., dissenting.
The employer should have such deduction made from the contract price
as will be equal to the difference between the value of the work agreed to be
done and the work actually accomplished. Luth on Damages, Vol. II, p. 1611.
In England, however, it was held that, what plaintiff is entitled to recover,
is the price agreed upon in specifications subject to a deduction, the measure
of which is the sum which it would take to make the work correspond to the
specifications. Thortnon v. Place, I Mood & Rob. 218. Iowa follows this
rule. Smith v. Bristol, 33 Iowa, 24. The latter rule is repudiated, however,
in many American jurisdictions on the ground that its application would, in
many cases, involve reconstruction as unreasonable and disproportionate
expense and the dictum of this case is followed. White v. MacLaren, 151
Mass. 553; Fagan v. Whitcomb, 14 S. W. 1018 (Tex.); Morton v. Harrison,
52 N. Y. Super. Ct. (2o Janis & S.) 3o5.
EMINENT DOMAIN-USE OF HIGHWAY FOR TELEPHONE LINE-INJUNC-
TION.-HoBBs V. LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH Co., 41 SOUTHERN
REP. ioo3 (ALABAMA).-Held, that a telephone line along the margin of a
highway is not an additional burden, entitling the abutting owner to compen-
sation. Even if the abutting owner on a highway is entitled to compensa-
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tion for the cutting of trees thereon'in the construction of a telephone line,
his remedy at law is adequate, and he is not entitled to injunction.
EviBENcE-PRnILEGS-RJGHT OF JURY TO DRAw INFERENCE-FROM
REFUSAL OF PARTY TO WAIVE PRIVILEGE.-PENN. R. R. Co. v. DUREE, Cut-
CUIT COURT OF APPEALS (JULY 24TH, igo6).-Held, that in an action for dam-
ages for injuries to the person, the trial judge properly refused to charge
the jury that they might infer from the plaintiff's refusal to waive her privi-
lege, and allow her physician to testify as to her condition, that such testi-
mony would have been unfavorable to her, or in fact to make any inference
at all.
EviBENcE--WITNESSES-IMPEACHMENT-CONTPADICTORY STATEMENTS-'-.
STATEMENTS CONSISTENT WITH TESTImoNY.-BuRicS v. STATE, 93 S. W. 983
(AIuCANSAS) .- Held, that where a witness has denied having made state-
ments contradictory of his testimony, and evidence of contradictory state-
ments is admitted, former statements of his consistent with his testimony are
not admissable to support him, in the absence of proof of change in the cir-
cumstances or relations which might have prompted a recent fabrication or
design to misrepresent the facts. See Comment ante.
EVIDENCE-CREDIBILITY OF WrTNESS.-ELECT
I
c FnEPROOFING CO. V.
SMITH, 99 N. Y. SUPP. 37.-Held, that the credibility of a witness need not
be submitted to the jury when his evidence is not contradicted directly nor
by legitimate inference and is not improbable, surprising, or suspicious.
Houghton, J., dissenting.
The general rule is that the question as to whether testimony is credible
or not and to what extent it is so, is the exclusive province of the jury.
Hamiill v. R. R. Co., 93 Ky. 343; White v. Ross, 35 Fla. 377. If the court
submits the credibility of the undisputed testimony of a witness to the jury,
it is error for which a higher court may set the verdict aside. Denton v. Car
roll, 4 N. Y. App. Div. 535. But where evidence between witnesses is in
any way conflicting it is the province of the jury to determine its credibility.
Fucrty v. Fritz, 6 Col. 137. Under what circumstances the trial court may
assume a question of fact to exist concerning which there is no conflict in the
practice seems to be to submit to the jury all questions of fact not expressly
admitted. Gay v. Tielkemeyer, 64 Mo. App. 112. Whether the testimony of
a witness is suspicious is a question for the jury in some states. VanVac-
ter v. McKillip, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 578.
EVIBENCE-ExPEMMENTs.-TAcKMAN v. BROTHERHOOD OF AMRICAN
YEOMAN, 106 N. W. 35o. Where in an action in a mutual benefit certificate
providing that defendant should not be liable if the member committed sui-
cide, the evidence showed deceased was found dead in his stable strangled
and suspended in a partially sitting posture by a portion of a bridle hanging
on a peg on which harness was usually hung, held, evidence of experiments
showing that, if a bridle was hung in the ordinary manner on the peg in ques-
tion, a person of the same height and weight as deceased would, if he fell
with his head in a loop formed by a strap of the bridle, be caught and stran-
gled if he did not regain his balance, was admissible.
In general it is permitted to show in proof of an alleged fact, that a result
similar to the fact in question was obtained from an experiment performed
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under conditions substantially similar to those admitted or proved to exist.
Collins v. People, 194 IIl. 5o6. The test of admissibility is-Will it aid rather
than confuse the jury? Burg. v. Chic. R. L & P. R. R. Co., go Ia. io6. The
question of admissibility is one necessarily resting largely in the discretion
of the trial judge. State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376. But where experiments are
relevant to the matter in issue and would tend to help the jury, exclusion is
reversible error. Farmer's & Mer. Bank v. Young, 36 Ia. 44. Experiments
must not be of an uncertain nature. Ulrich v. People, 39 Mich. 245. So it
was inadmissible to show that two bloodhounds of the same breed as those
used in tracking the supposed criminal, when put on the trail of a human
being, had left it to follow the trail of a sheep. Simpson v. State, ii Ala. 6.
EVIDENCE-DECLARATIONS-REs GESTAE.-BAKER v. DRAKE, 41 SOUTH, 845
(ALA.).-Held, that the rule, that declarations of a party in actual possession
of property asserting title in himself are admissible in evidence as part of the
res gesta, explanatory of the possession, does not extend to his declarations
as to the history and source of such title.
The above rule applies equally to real or personal property. Ray ,.
Jackson, go Ala. 513. But the rule has not gone so far as to allow an agent's
declaration as to the ownership of property in his possession. Standefer v.
Chisholm, i Stew. and P. 449 (Ala.). The present owner's declarations
against his title are admissible but not for the purpose of supporting his title
or that of those under him or to contradict the witnesses of the other side.
geste. Roebke v. Andrews, 26 Wis. 311; Howell v. Hyack, 2 Abb. Dec. 423;
Turner v. Belden, 9 Mo. 797. Since possession is presumptive evidence of
title, the declarations of the possessor made during the continuance of pos-
session, may be put in evidence to explain the character of his possession
when the title is in controversy and even declarations qualifying the posses-
sion of property, at the time of its sale, are admissible as a part of the res
likewise as to the present possessor's declaration as that he holds it in his
own right or as tenant or as trustee. Thomas v. Wheeler, 47 Mo. 363.
FOOD-REGULATING SALE OF BUTTER-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-EX PARTE
DIETRIcH, 84 PAc. 770 (CAL.). Act requiring packages of butter offered for
sale to be marked with their exact weight.-Held, not to be a valid exercise
of the police power, but is unconstitutional as being a restriction on the right
to property and privilege of following a lawful business.
The exercise of the police power must be reasonable. Chicago v
Rumpif, 45 II. go. A law which interferes with property by hampering the
owner in purposes of trade and commerce is unconstitutional and void. (A
law requiring certain goods to be marked "convict-made.") In this case the
required mark, itself, was detrimental. People z'. Hawkins, 157 N. Y. i.
The police power is properly exercised in regulation of manner and sale of
articles, by such requirements as will tend to insure against fraud and injury.
State ex rel Atty. Gen. v. Capitol City Dairy Co., 62 Ohio St. 350. Statute
prohibiting sale of imitation butter unless colored pink has for its object the
prevention of fraud and is constitutional. Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 536.
Rules for the conduct of most necessary and common occupations are pre-
scribed, when from their nature, they afford peculiar opportunities for impo-
sition and fraud. Cooley, Const. Lim., 5th ed. 743. Where act provides for
marking of packages containing oleomargarine, a city cannot grant a license
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to sell without so marking, apparently therefore upholding the validity 
of
such a provision. Haines v. People, 7 Colo. App. 467. Legislature has the
power to pass such laws as it may deem necessary to prevent deception 
and
fraud. People v. Arensburg, io5 N. Y. 123.
LEGISLATION-RIGHT OF STATE TO CONTROL SPECULATION IN THEATER
TICIETs.-Ex PARTE QUARG, 84 PAC. 766 (CALIFORNIA).-Held, that a stat-
ute, prohibiting any person from selling tickets to theaters or other 
public
places of amusement for a higher price than that originally charged by the
management. is in conflict with the State Constitution which secures every
person the right of "acquiring, possessing and protecting property" and there-
fore void. See Comment ante.
MANUFACTURERS-LIABILITY FOR DEFECTS IN ARTICLES MADE-WHO 
MAY
SUE.-WATsoN v. AUGUSTA BREWING COMPANY, 52 S. E. 152 (GA.).-
Action to recover, from defendant, damages for injuries resulting from the
swallowing of glass which the defendant had bottled up with a beverage,
which he advertised as harmless and refreshing. Defendant contended that
he was not liable because there was no privity of relationship between the par-
ties, inasmuch as the beverage had not been sold directly by the defendant to
the plaintiff.-Held, that the defendant is liable on the ground that he has
violated a duty owed by him to the general public.
MASTER AND SERvANT-RAILRoADS-AssuMED RISKS.-PHIPPIN V. MIS-
SOURI PAC. R. Co., 93 S. W. (Mo.) 4 Io.-Held, that where a switch-tender
whose duty is to line switches so as to prevent the cornering of cars, fails to
perform that duty properly, and plaintiff,-whose duty is to couple. such cars,
is injured thereby, that plaintiff did not assume such risks, but that the neg-
ligence is that of the master.
This case shows a further limitation on the fellow-servant rule as estab-
lished in Murray v. S. C. R. Co., 36 A. D. (S. C.) 268 (1841) to the effect that
an employer contracts with a view to all ordinary risks. This doctrine
was followed in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Ry. Co., 38 A. D. (Mass.)
339, and -have been adopted as the general rule. Randall v. Baltimore &
0. R. Co., 1O9 U. S. 478. With the great increase in the" relationships of mas-
ter and servants the hardships of the rule became apparent and statutory
changes have been adopted in the various states; Colorado alone having
wholly abandoned the rule. Acts of 1893, section 5. This change in Mis-
souri was by a process of paring down the general rule, first, so as to recog-
nize degrees of subordination among servants; Moon v. Wabash, S.t. L. &
P. R. Co., 85 Mo. 588. then reasonable care as to general conditions of
employment; Soeder v. St. Louis, L M. & S. R. Co., ioo Mo. 673, and finally
by statute as followed in the principal case by the exemptions as to railroads
was abolished.
MASTER AND SERVANT-RAILROADS-DEFECTIVE TRACK.-ST. Louis, I. M.
& S. Ry. Co. v. MIzE. 95 S. W. 488 (ARI.).-Held, that a railroad company
is under no obligations to its employees to repair its track provided due
notice is given of such defect. Battle, J., dissenting.
This ruling is based on the doctrine as expressed by the maxim. Volenti
nnt fit injuria; O'Maley v. South Boston Gaslight Co., 158 Mass. 135; the
interpretation of which has given rise to two schools. Walsh v. Whildey, L.
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R., 21 Q. B. Div. 371. One is based on the implied contract from the ser-
vants election to expose himself. Gleason v. New York & N. E. Ry. Co.,
159 Mass. 68; Bonnet v. G. H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 89 Tex. 72. The other
recognizes the inequality arising from the greater disadvantage of the servant.
Fitzgerald v. Conn. River Paper Co., I55 Mass. 155. The latter was applied
to virtual compulsion; Brazil Black Coal Co. v. Hoadlet, 129 Ind. 327. Later
this has been reduced to physical compulsion; Eldridge v. Atlas S. S. Co.,
134 N. Y. 187; and therefore leaves the former as the prevailing doctrine.
But some courts have held contra to the rule as decided in the principal
case. McKee v. C. R. L and P. Ry. Co., 83 Iowa 616.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
-Rocco v. F. A. GILLEPSIE Co.. 64 ATL. II8 (N. J.) A servant was injured
while engaged in the excavation of a trench.-Held, that when the obvious
danger increases as the work advances and the servant may protect himself
and is injured through his failure to do so, the master is not liable.
The points embodied in this case are luminous for the purpose of illus-
trating the minute discriminations which the courts are inclined to make
between cases arising under the broad maxim, Volenti non fit injuria, rein-
forced by the specific rule that a servant cannot recover for injuries resulting
from obvious risks freely accepted. Fitzgerald v. Conn. River Paper Co., i55
Mass. 155. One of the most material variations of this rule is that the risks
incurred must have been of such a nature as to have been readily perceived
and easily understood. Dean v. Saint Louis Woodenware Co., 8o S.. W. 292
(Mo.). In particular are these nice distinctions discernible in cases like this
one, analogously decided, where the injuries were incurred during the prog-
ress of work in tunnels or excavations. The caving in of a completed por-
tion of a tunnel or excavation is not one of the risks assumed by a servant.
The permanently completed portion of such a tunnel or excavation is an
appliance and must be kept in safe and proper condition by the master.
Hanley v. California Bridge and Construction Co., 47 L. R. A. 597 (Cal.).
Where, however, the place of work is constantly changing, furnishing a fit-
and safe place to work, is a part of the work itself and is one of the ordinary
risks assumed by the servant. Coal & Mining Co. v. Clay, si Ohio State
MASTER AND SERANT-OBvious DANGERS-ASSUMPTION OF RISKS BY
UNION.-MoSs v. MoSLEY, 41 S. 1012 (ALA.).-Held, that a boy between
thirteen and fourteen years old, assumed obvious risks, when directed by
the defendant's intestate to clean up about a machine, though he had
worked at the brickyard only a short time, and this was not his regular job,
and no action for his death would lie. Denson, J., dissenting.
The weight of authority in the United States is that the master must use
due diligence in selection of all servants. Whittaker v. Delaware, etc., Ry.,
126 N. Y. 544; Parke v. N. Y. Cent. Ry., i55 N. Y. 215. Some courts allow
evidence to show incompetence. Huffcut on Agency, p. 352, note 4. Ordi-
narily a minor employee has no greater right of action than an older person
under the same circumstances. Gilbert v. Guild, I44 Mass. 60; McGinnis s,.
Canada So. Bridge Co., 49 Mich. 466. Few courts hold that it is not the
employer's duty to instruct a servant, unless information is asked, or that the
latter is known to be inexperienced. No. Pac. Ry. v. Watts, 63 Texas 549;
Costello v. Judson, 21 (Hun.) N. Y. 396. A minor assumes obvious risks of
his employment Mineral Ry. v. Marcus, 195 Ala. 389. His fear of dis-
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charge is not coercion. Sweeney v. Berlin Co., ioI N. Y. 2o. Contra, Mason
v. Richmond Ry., iii N. C. 482. Mere employment of a minor about dan-
gerous work is not negligence per se. Penn Co. v. Long, 94 Ind. 250; Texas,
etc., Ry. v. Charlton, 6o Tex. 397. Infancy in and of itself does not pre-
clude his assumption of risks. De Graff v. N. Y. Cent. Ry., 76 N. Y. 125. Yet
if his judgment is so immature as to be unable to comprehend the danger of
the machine, the employer would be liable. Taylor v. Wootan, I Ind. i88;
Goins v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 37 Mo. App. 221.
NFGLIGENCE-MAINTENANCE OF TURNTABLE BY RAILROAD-LIABILITY.-
WALKER'S ADM'R V. POTOMAC, F. & P. R. Co., 53 SOUTHEASTERN REP. i13
(VIRGINIA). This case repudiates the turntable doctrine as established in
most states, inasmuch as it holds that, under the common law rule that a land-
owner owes no duty to a trespasser, a railroad company is guilty of no negli-
gence in maintaining an unlocked turntable on its premises at a distance of
from fifty to three hundred feet from public land, and hence, is not liable for
an accident causing the death of a child twelve years of age who trespassed
upon such ground.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-IMPLIED CONTRACT-KNOwLDGE OF AGENT.-
BLOWER V. SOUTHERN Ry. Co., 54 So. E. 368 (So. CAROLINA).--eld, that if a
mail messenger for the government transfers mail, which is the duty of the
railway company while thinking that he is doing government work, and the
general agent of said railway company accepts the benefits of his labor, with
knowledge of the mistake, such company is liable for the reasonable value of
the work done.
If a person allows another to work for him under such circumstances
that no reasonable man would suppose that the latter was doing it for noth-
ing, he will be liable on an implied contract. Day v. Caton, Ii9 Mass. 513;
Huck v. Flentze, 8o Ill. 258. The doing of the work is an offer; the acqui-
escence in its being done is the acceptance. Clark on Contracts, 2nd Ed. 15.
The implication is merely one of fact. Pol. Cont., 9; Leake on Cont., Ii.
One cannot recover for labor voluntarily performed for another under
no express nor implied promise to pay. De Montague v. Bacharach,
187 Mass. 128; Watkins v. Richmond College, 41 Mo. 302. As a gen-
eral rule mere silence does not constitute a ratification of agency. Royal
Ins. Co. v. Beatty, 119 Pa. St. 6. Where, however, special circum-
stances and good faith require a man to speak and he does not, he is
thereafter estopped to deny the agency. Huffcut on Agency, 49. More-
over, such principal must ratify the transaction in toto. Mundorff v. Wick-
ersham, 63 Pa. St. 87; Eberts v. Selover, 44 Mich. 519. This principle also
applies where the agent, alone, has knowledge of such material facts. Hyatt
v. Clark, I18 N. Y. 563; Satterfield v. Malone, 35 Fed. 445.
POWERS-SALE OF LAND--AUTHORITY OF ONE TRUSTEE.-HILL ET AL V.
PEOPLE, 95 S. W. 990 (ARK.).-Held, when 'land was devised by
testator to three trustees, with full power to sell and carry same, the con-
currence of two of the trustees was essential to the validity of a sale under
the power.
Testator has power to require a power of sale to be exercised jointly by
the executors and trustees and such intention must be given full force and
effect. 8o Md. 454. When authority to sell land is given all the acting
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executors living at the time must join in the sale, 3 Day 384.
When a deed was executed by two executors during the lifetime of third
and it did not appear that he had given his assent, the deed was held ineffec-
tual as a conveyance. 9 N. Y. S. 389.
General opinion seems to be where one executor acts and it is expressly
or impliedly assented to by the others it is valid. Banus v. Drake, 5o N. C.
153; Silverthorn v. McKinister, 12 Pa. (2 Jones) 67; Dunn's Ex'rs v.
Renick, 40 W. Va. 549.
RAILROADS-PUBLIC HIGHWAYS-SHIFTING OF CARs.-LONG V. MISSOURI
PAc. Ry. Co., 91 S. W. (Mo.) 1012.-Held, that "shunting" cars and "flying
the switch" across public highways without warning is negligence, per se.
This doctrine is by no means settled. Some jurisdictions hold that it
extends to trespassers where there is no public highway. Patton v. East
Tenn., V. & G. R. Co., 89 Tenn. 370. Contra.-'right v. Boston & A. R.
Co., 142 Mass. 396. The general rule seems to be that the question of negli-
gence is to be left to the jury. Delaware. L. & IV. R. Co. v. Converse. 139
U. S. 469; Chicago, R. L & P. R. Co. %,. Dignian, 56 Ill. 487. Some jurisdic-
tions hold that contributory negligence on the part of the traveler does not
preclude his right of recovery. Penn R. Co. v. McGirr, 61 Md. io8. Contra,-
Haley v. N. Y. Central & H. R. R. Co., 7 Hun. 84.
RAILROADS-INJURIES TO PEDESTRIANs-LABILITY TO TRESPASSERS.-
BROWN v. BOSToN & M. R. R., 64 ATL. 194 (N. H.). A trespasser, an old
and partially deaf woman, while walking on defendant's track was killed by
an express train. Neither engineer nor fireman saw trespasser on the track.
Held, that a railroad company is liable for negligently killing deceased while
she was walking by the track, even though she was a trespasser, providing
she was in the exercise of due care and the defendant's servants failed to
exercise due care to discover her presence in such a situation, when circum-
stances existed which would have put a person of average prudence on
inquiry. Young, J., dissenting.
There seems to be no other decided case which carries to such an extent
the doctrine promulgated by this case. On the other hand, the weight of
authority is to the contrary. The well settled general rule is that railroads
are liable for injuries to trespassers only when the railroad has been guilty
of gross negligence. Western & A. R. R. v. Meigs, 74 Ga. 857; Richmond &
D. R. Co. v. Tay, io6 N. C. 404. This rule is usually construed to mean that
the trespasser in order to recover must show that the persons in charge of
the train saw him and after seeing him failed to exercise reasonable dili-
gence to prevent the injuries. Gherkins v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 30 S. W.
651 (Ky.). Another class of cases holds that the only duty a railroad com-
pany owes a trespasser is to refrain from wantonly and wilfully injuring
him. Ill. Cent. R. R. v. Eicher, 202 Il. 556.
RAILROADS-CROSSING ACCIDENT-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-SANGUIN-
ETTE V. MIss. RIVER, ETC., RY. Co., 95 S. W. 386 (Mo.).-Held, where a per-
son, familiar with the railroad crossing, was being driven in a vehicle by
another, but did not look for an approaching train, he was guilty of contrib-
utory negligence as a matter of law and an action for his death would not
lie.
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In the absence of statute, the general rule in the United States is that
there is no presumption of negligence on the part of a railroad company for
an injury to a non-passenger. Cooley on Torts, 2nd Ed., p. 797. The care
required by the latter, however, is such as an ordinarily prudent man would
exercise under like circumstances. Phila. R. R. Co. v. Publes, 67 Fed. 591;
Wilds v. Hudson River R. Co., 29 N. Y. 315. But in the application of this
rule the courts are somewhat in conflict. Most courts hold that it is suffi-
cient to look in both directions for an approaching train. Rodrian v. N. Y.,
etc., R. R. Co., 125 N. Y. 526; Chicago B. & G. R. Co v. Van Pattern, 74 Ill.
91. The Federal Courts agree that the traveler must stop, also Dunning v.
Bond, 38 Fed. 813. The fact that the occupant of a vehicle is driven by
another does not relieve him. Durkee v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 88 Hun.
471; Dean v. Penn. R. Co., 129 Pa. 514. Many states hold that where a
crossing is particularly dangerous, the degree of care is more imperative.
Thomas v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 8 Fed. 729. Wilas v. Hudson River
Co., 29 N. Y. 315. Missouri formerly held that it was not necessary to "stop.
look and listen." Zimmerman v. Hannibal St. J. R. Co., 71 Mo. 476. The
weight of authority to-day is that this is not negligence per se, but is only
evidence thereof. Terre Haute I. R. Co.. v. Voelker, 129 Ill. 540; Winslow v.
Boston & A. R. Co., ii N. Y. 83.
REORGANIZATION OF MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANIES.-HuBER v. MARTIN,
i05 N. W. 1031 (WISCONSI).-Held, that a statutory scheme for the reor-
ganization of a mutual insurance company and the transfer of its assets,
including an accumulated surplus, to its successor, is in conflict with the
constitutional inhibition against laws impairing the obligation of contracts
and in violation of the provisions of the Federal Constitution as fo the equal
protection of the laws and the deprivation of property without due process
of law.
SECURITIES-SALE OF PLEDGED STOCK-CONTENT v. BANNER.-76 N. E.
913 (N. Y.).-Hcld, that where a stockbroker advances all the money
and buys securities for a customer, a written notice to the customer to take
up the securities so bought, or supply margins for carrying them, and stating
that unless he does so before a certain date the broker will sell the stock for
his account and hold him responsible for the amount, is defective, where it
contains no statement as to the time or place of the sale, and that, in the
absence of any agreement dispensing with notice, a sale on the "curb" consti-
tutes a conversion though the customer has failed to respond on the date
stated.
TORTS-MASTER AND SERVANT-EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY TO SERVANT.-BAN-
NON v. N. Y. CENT. & H. R. R. Co., 98 N. Y. SuPP. 770. While one acting
as foreman attempted to move a tie across the railroad track, a train struck
the tie and injured a member of the crew.-Held, that the foreman was then
acting as a fellow-servant and that the employer was not liable to the work-
man for his negligence under employer's Liability Act. Laws 19o2, p. 1748, c.
6oo. Law recognizes that employee may have two duties; those of a superin-
tendent and those of an ordinary workman. Kellard v. Rooke, 192 B. D. 585;
Cushnman, v. Chase, i56 Mass. 342. If the act is within the duty of a servant,
the one doing it, regardless of his rank, is a fellow-servant of the one injured
by its negligent performance. Geoghegan v. Atlas S. S. Co., 146 N. Y. 369;
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The Deep Mining & Drainage Co. v. Fitzgerald, 21 Col. 533; Fitzgerald v.
Houkomp, 44 Ill. App. 365. A workman cannot recover from his employer
for an injury caused by the negligence of the foreman or superintendent in
the performance of such work as properly pertains to a servant Stock-
meyer v. Reed, 55 Ala. 259.
There is a minority doctrine that although the character of the act may
be that of a fellow-servant, the master is liable to the servant for an injury
caused by the act of the foreman. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Miss., 243 S. W.
328; Russ v. Wabash Western Ry. Co., 112 Mo. 45.
TELEGRAPHS-DELAY IN DELIVERING MESSAGE-WHAT LAW GOVERNS.-
WESTERN UNION TEL. Co. v. LACER, 93 S. W. 34 (Ky.).-Held, that the lia-
bility of a telegraph company for delay in delivery of a message sent from
one state into another, is governed by the law of the state in which the mes-
sage is sent, though the mistake which caused the delay was made by an agent
of the company in the other state.
The fact that the initial and terminal points of a message sent by tele-
graph are not in the same state is not material in an action against the com-
pany to recover damages for a breach of its common law duty to use proper
care to effect a prompt and correct transmission and delivery. Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Mellon, 96 Tenn. 66. There is a proper distinction drawn
between an action brought to recover a penalty and an action brought to
recover damages, for a mistake made in another state. If the action is
brought to recover a penalty, it will fail as the penal laws of a state do not
extend beyond its boundaries. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122
U. S. 347. On the other hand a telegraph company which undertakes to cor-
rectly transmit a message to another state is liable in the state where the mes-
sage is sent for damages for breach of its contract in the other state. Kemp
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 28 N. C. 661.
WILLS-EVIDENCE OF UNDUE INFLUENCE-DECLAP.ATIONS OF TESTATOR.-
WETZ V. SCHNEIDER, 96 S. V. 59 (TExAs).-Held, that declarations, made
before or after the execution of the will, by a testator. are not admissible as
evidence of undue influence, or of the truth of the facts stated by him, but
only as manifestations of his mental condition. James. C. J.. dissenting.
This decision points out the distinct line of cleavage between those cases
which hold that declarations of the testator are admissible as evidence and
the cases which hold that such declarations are not admissible, when the
question of undue influence is in issue. On the one hand, such declarations
are not admissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements
they contain, whether or not these statements indicate constraint exercised
upon the testator. Under such circumstances, being made before or after the
execution of the will. these statements would be mere hearsay evidence.
Westfall v. Wait, 73 N. E. io89 (Ind.). This objection fails, however, when
such statements were contemporaneous with the execution of the will, for in
such case they are of course part of the res gestr. Jackson s. Kniffcn, 3 Am.
Dec. 390 (N. Y.). On the other hand, declarations made within a reason-
able time before or after the execution of the will. are admissible. but only
for the purpose of showing the condition of the testator's mind and his sus-
ceptibility to the alleged undue influence. Lucas v. Cannon. 76 Ky. 650; Rob-
inson v. Hutchinson, 26 Vt. 38. And there must be other direct evidence of
the exercise of undue influence before such declarations can be received. In
re Hess' Will, 48 Minn. 5o4.
